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In recent years, gray markets have become a signiﬁcant phenomenon in the business practice. This paper investigates the
gray markets issues in differentiated duopoly case by considering quantity competition among ﬁrms. We develop a
game-theoretic model and provide equilibrium results for three scenarios, i.e. the benchmark scenario ‘no gray market’,
the scenario ‘parallel imports act as a buffer against a follower’s product’ and the scenario ‘gray markets stimulate the
competition’. By the analysis of the equilibrium results, some important managerial insights are obtained. Finally, by
comparison of the equilibrium results among different scenarios, we study the impact of gray markets on manufacturers’
optimal strategies and proﬁts in differentiated duopoly.
Keywords: gray markets; parallel imports; manufacturer competition; differentiated duopoly
1. Introduction
Gray markets refer to the trade of genuine-brand products through unauthorised distribution channel. Unlike black
markets in which counterfeit goods or even stolen goods are sold illegally, gray markets are generally considered legal
since the gray market goods (also known as parallel imports) are genuine-brand products diverted from authorised chan-
nels. With the efﬁcient global logistics networks and thriving e-business, gray markets have become so prevalent that a
wide range of industries all over the world are greatly affected. For instance, in Malaysia, gray market sales of cell
phone account for 70% of the total cell phone sales (Antia, Dutta, and Bergen 2004); in India, sales of gray market ﬂash
cards account for 25% of the market (Autrey, Bova, and Soberman 2015); in China, about 1 million iPhones diverted
from other countries are unlocked and sold in gray market in 2007 (New York Times 2008). According to a survey by
KPMG (2008), the IT products sold in gray markets were worth about 58 billion dollars and account for about 8% of
total global IT sales.
Due to the prevalence of gray markets, parallel importation becomes a signiﬁcant phenomenon challenging the ﬁrms.
Managing gray markets has already been an important but difﬁcult issue for ﬁrms in their decisions-making processes.
In reality, many ﬁrms argue that the presence of gray markets hurts their proﬁts. For example, in September 2001,
Apple, HP and some other IT companies set up a so-called ‘Anti-Gray Market Alliance’ to lobby against gray markets.
Many researchers such as Autrey and Bova (2012), Li and Robles(2007), Maskus and Chen (2004), and Antia, Dutta,
and Bergen (2004) also take the position that gray markets are the serious problem faced by the ﬁrms. However, the
impact of gray markets on ﬁrms’ proﬁts is still rather vague. Hu, Pavlin, and Shi (2013) ﬁnd that the impact of gray
markets depends on the reseller’s inventory holding cost. Ahmadi, Iravani, and Mamani (2015) claim that manufacturer
blocks parallel importer when the product is a commodity but ignores parallel importer when the product is a fashion
item. Further, there is much literature showing that the gray markets are beneﬁcial for ﬁrms. Ahmadi and Yang (2000)
argue that the manufacturer can beneﬁt from the presence of gray markets when it incurs higher transaction costs in
higher priced market. Other researchers also claim that the presence of gray markets can be beneﬁcial to manufacturers
under some conditions (Gerstner and Holthausen 1986; Dutta, Bergen, and John 1994; Yang, Ahmadi, and Monroe
1998; Raff and Schmitt 2007; Xiao, Palekar, and Liu 2011; Ichino 2014). As pointed out by these works, parallel
imports regarded as a low-quality substitute of the authorised products can be used as a device of price discrimination
to enhance manufacturers’ proﬁts. As drivers of gray markets, price differentiation caused by differences in demand
between markets, currency exchange rates or segmentation strategy across markets is most commonly considered as the
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main driver of gray markets (Ahmadi and Yang 2000; Chen and Maskus 2005; Xiao, Palekar, and Liu 2011; Autrey,
Bova, and Soberman 2014; Ahmadi, Iravani, and Mamani 2015). For example, Ahmadi and Yang (2000) analyse a
game-theoretic model in which a vertically integrated manufacturer sells to two countries at different prices and an inde-
pendent agent takes the advantage of price differential between the two markets for arbitrage as a parallel importer. In
addition to this stream of work, there is other literature considering demand uncertainty or misaligned incentives in the
supply chain as the driver of gray markets from the operational level (Dasu, Ahmadi, and Carr 2012; Su and
Mukhopadhyay 2012; Altug and van Ryzin 2013; Hu, Pavlin, and Shi 2013). Recently, Shulman (2014) shows that
retailers may divert products to unauthorised sellers in the absence of commonly viewed necessary conditions. Autrey,
Bova, and Soberman (2014) use a model of Cournot quantity competition to analyse the ﬁrm’s organisational structure
decision in the presence of gray markets. They ﬁnd that decentralisation is optimal under some conditions including the
condition that gray market is relatively uncompetitive.
In the extant literature, although numerous studies have been successful in investigating the issue of gray markets, most
of them analyse it in a monopolistic context. To the best of our knowledge, only few papers consider the problem of gray
markets in differentiated duopoly. For instance, Shavandi, Valizadeh Khaki, and Khedmati (2015) consider the competition
between manufacturers in a low market. The authors neglect the asymmetry between manufacturers for simplicity and ﬁnd
that the proﬁt of the manufacturer challenged by the gray markets may be better off under some conditions.
However, in practice, when there exists manufacturers’ competition in the high-demand market, parallel imports may
not only challenge the market share of a leading manufacturer but also the market share of other competing manufactur-
ers. To provide a real-life example of the interactions we seek to model, we choose the example of the competition
between Apple Inc. and Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd in the smartphone market to illustrate. Huawei is the top 10
mobile phone manufacturer all over the world and its market mainly focuses on local market, i.e. fast-growing Chinese
market.1 And it is very hard for Huawei to enter the market of developed countries, such as the US market, due to
many factors (e.g. political barriers). In addition, the majority of customers in developed countries prefer to use the pre-
mium brand products such as iPhone, there is limit demand for Huawei. As it is well-known, iPhone is very popular in
the Chinese gray market and a large number of unauthorised iPhones sourced from the US ﬂoods into China due to
price differentiation (As aforementioned, about 1 million iPhones are unlocked and diverted to China in 2007). In fact,
the unauthorised iPhone (i.e. parallel imports) becomes a big threat to Huawei in Chinese market, because the unautho-
rised iPhone can play the role of inferior version in Apple’s product line (similar to the role of iPhone 5c in Apple’s
product line) and attract the consumers of Huawei at a low price. Under this situation, besides the cannibalisation effect,
gray market also helps the leading manufacturer to intensify the competition towards the follower and squeeze the fol-
lower’s market share.
To close the gap in the literature, we investigate the competition between manufacturers in a high market and con-
sider quality difference among manufacturers’ products and parallel imports. We analyse a supply chain model consist-
ing of two manufacturers and one parallel importer to answer the following interesting research questions. Given that
the quality of manufacturer 1’s authorised product is the highest, when the quality of parallel imports is higher than that
of manufacturer 2’s product, parallel imports actually become a buffer between manufacturers 1 and 2 and help manu-
facturer 1 to seize market share from manufacturer 2, could manufacturer 1 earn a greater proﬁt under this scenario?
When the quality of parallel imports is lower than that of manufacturer 2’s product, parallel imports only compete with
manufacturer 2 in the low market directly and the cannibalisation effect is restricted. How would the proﬁt change of
manufacturer 1 be? By comparison of the cases with no gray markets setting, how would the proﬁts of two manufactur-
ers change in these two different scenarios?
To answer the above questions, we adopt the vertical differentiation model (Shaked and Sutton 1982; Motta 1993;
Mussa and Rosen 1978) commonly used in economics and marketing, and allow consumers to have three options for
quality, i.e. buying authorised products from manufacturer 1 or manufacturer 2 and buying the parallel imports produced
by manufacturer 1 (hereafter manufacturer 1 represents the leading manufacturer who produces products with the best
quality, while manufacturer 2 is the follower producing inferior products). We develop a game-theoretic model and pro-
vide equilibrium results for three scenarios, i.e. the benchmark scenario ‘no gray market’, the scenario ‘parallel imports
act as a buffer against a follower’s product’ and the scenario ‘gray markets stimulate the competition’. By the analysis
of the equilibrium results, some important managerial insights are obtained. Finally, by comparison of the equilibrium
results among different scenarios, we study the impact of gray markets on manufacturers’ optimal strategies and proﬁts
in differentiated duopoly
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we study the gray markets issues under manufacturer competition
in the high market. This paper complements the literature and shows that under various possible ranks of perceived
values of authorised products and parallel imports, both manufacturers are hurt by the presence of gray markets. Second,
we consider the asymmetry between manufacturers and adopt the vertical differentiation model and shows that both
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manufacturers will prefer the situation ‘Stimulating the competition’ when the gray markets emerge. Third, our results
indicate that the leading manufacturer copes with the challenges from the following manufacturer and parallel importer
only by adjusting the sale quantity in low market but never changes the sale quantity decision in high market. In
response to the threat from parallel imports, the following manufacturer should improve the quality of its product.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the basic setting of the model. Section 3 presents
equilibrium outcomes in three scenarios, including the benchmark scenario ‘no gray markets’, the scenario ‘parallel
imports act as the buffer against follower’s product’ and the scenario ‘gray markets stimulate the competition’. Section 4
compares the equilibrium outcomes of different scenarios and gets some valuable managerial insights. Section 5 pro-
vides the conclusions of this paper and directions for future research.
2. The model
Our model considers two manufacturers, indexed 1 and 2. Each of them produces differentiated product (i.e. manufac-
turer i produces product i, i = 1, 2). Manufacturer 1 sells product 1 in two different markets indexed by j ( j = 1, 2),
while manufacturer 2 only sells product 2 in market 2 and engages in quantity competition with manufacturer 1. These
two different markets can be also regarded as two different countries (See Ahmadi and Yang 2000; Autrey, Bova, and
Soberman 2014, 2015). In addition, when gray market is active, parallel imports might be treated as the third type of
product (i.e. product 3 denoted as i = 3). Similar to Ahmadi and Yang (2000), we assume consumers are differentiated
according to their willingness to pay for the products in each market, and deﬁne market 1 as a ‘low’ market with a low
consumer willingness to pay and market 2 as a ‘high’ market with a high consumer willingness to pay. Here, we can
take market 1 (the US market) as the low market and market 2 (Chinese market) as the high market. Note that the lower
willingness to pay in the US may reﬂect the ﬁerce competition of the market (Szymanski and Valletti 2005). In China,
many consumers, especially young people, are enthusiasts of Apple products. Thus, the willingness to pay for iPhone in
China is still much larger than that in the US. As a result, iPhone is priced much higher in China than in the US.
There is a gray market in which the parallel importer is an independent agent engaged in arbitrage by buying autho-
rised products of manufacturer 1 in market 1 and reimporting them into market 2. Furthermore, we assume only the
leading manufacturer’s product (i.e. product 1) might be the target of parallel importation, while product 2 does not suf-
fer from parallel importation problems. In reality, the fact is that the leading manufacturer’s product is much more likely
to be the target of parallel importation than other products. For example, a huge number of iPhones are sold by gray
market ﬁrms while other brands of mobile phones (like Huawei mobile phone) rarely ﬂood into gray markets. There-
fore, there are three players in market 2, including manufacturer 1, manufacturer 2 and parallel importer selling unautho-
rised product 1. In market 1, there is only one manufacturer (manufacturer 1) acting as monopolist. There can be many
reasons that manufacturer 2 can only sell its products in one market, such as production cost and governmental or
political factors. Figure 1 illustrates the market structure presumed in the presence of gray markets.
Market 1
Manufacturer 1 Manufacturer 2
Market 2
Figure 1. Markets structures with parallel importation in differentiated duopoly (Parallel importation is represented by a dashed
arrow from market 1 to market 2).
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Next, we specify the sequence of stages of the game in our model. To consider the relationship between
manufactures, we model manufacturer 1 dominating the market (e.g. Apple Inc.) is the leader in this Stackelberg game
and manufacturer 2 (e.g. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd) is the follower. When the gray market is inactive, in stage 1,
manufacturer 1 decides on the sale quantity of product 1 in both the market 1 and market 2. In stage 2, given the quan-
tities chosen by manufacturer 1, manufacturer 2 decides on the sale quantity of product 2 in market 2. When the gray
market is active, the timeline is shown as follows: in stage 1, manufacturer 1 decides on the quantity sold in both mar-
ket 1 and market 2. In stage 2, given the quantities chosen by manufacturer 1, manufacturer 2 and parallel importer
decide on the quantity sold in market 2 simultaneously. Taking the launch of iPhone, for example, Apple obtains the
ﬁrst-mover advantage in the market and Huawei is the follower. After Apple launches the new version of iPhone,
Huawei will launch the new version of mobile phone correspondingly to compete with newest iPhone and the parallel
importer reacts to the launch of new iPhone immediately in a short time. In this short period, the following
manufacturer and parallel importer do not know each other’s decision information and decide on the quantity sold
simultaneously.
Further, we assume that the quality of parallel imports is perceived lower than the quality of the authorised products
in consumer valuation. That is because parallel imports may not include after-sales or warranty service and may have
incompatibility problems. Actually, there are three kinds of products sold by manufacturer 1, manufacturer 2 and parallel
importer in market 2. For notation convenience, we use product 3 to denote parallel imports and these two terms are
used interchangeably in our model.
Next, we set up the environment deﬁned by some assumptions in order to make the analysis tractable and enable us
to focus on the issues we want to explore. These assumptions are given as below:
(1) We assume that manufacturer 1 is the leader of the market, whose products have the highest quality. Normalis-
ing the quality of product 1 to 1, we use d\1 to represent the quality of product 2 and h\1 to represent the
discounted quality of parallel imports (Hereafter, for simplicity, we use the term ‘quality’ to denote the perceived
valuation of products). In short, we allow for the vertical differentiation among these three kinds of products by
setting the quality of product 1, product 2 and parallel imports to be 1, δ and θ, respectively (i.e. 0\d; h\1).
Thus, product 1 is the best product in quality and the quality of parallel imports could be higher or lower than
that of product 2.
(2) In each market, consumers are differentiated according to their willingness to pay for the product and buy at
most one unit of product offered in up to three quality levels. Let vij and pij denote the quality and the retail
price of product i (i = 1, 2, 3) sold in market j, respectively, and let tj represent in market j( j = 1, 2), the con-
sumer’s marginal willingness to pay for perceived quality vij. Then a consumer in market j derives the following
utility from purchasing product i: Uij ¼ vijtj  pij.
(3) For simplicity, we normalise both the production costs, selling costs and other transaction costs such as taxes
and shipping cost to zero as in Xiao, Palekar, and Liu (2011) and Shavandi, Valizadeh Khaki, and Khedmati
(2015). In market 1, there is a unit mass of consumers whose willingness to pay for quality t1 is uniformly dis-
tributed on the interval ½0; a1. In market 2, there is also a unit mass of consumers whose willingness to pay for
quality t2 is uniformly distributed on the interval ½0; a2. And we assume that a2 > a1 in order to deﬁne market
1 as the low market and market 2 as the high market.
We follow the typical assumption that each consumer purchases either one unit of product with the highest net utility
or nothing if consumption utility is negative or zero. In market 1, a consumer’s utility from purchasing product 1 is
t1 – p11. In market 2, a consumer’s utility from purchasing product 1 is t2 – p12, and the utility derived from the product
2 and product 3 is δt2 – p22 and θt2 – p32, respectively. Then we determine the rank order of the three types of products
in terms of quality, and there are two different cases considered in our study, which are the case (δ < θ < 1) and the case
(θ < δ < 1). In the ﬁrst case, the quality of parallel imports is higher than that of product 2 while in the second case the
quality of parallel imports is lower than that of product 2.
We derive the demand functions by identifying the marginal consumers who are indifferent between a pair of alter-
natives (including the no purchase option). The marginal indifferent consumer in market 1 is located at t1 ¼ p11, and
then we derived the demand of product 1 in market 1: q11 ¼ 1a1 ða1  t1Þ ¼ 1
p11
a1
.To demonstrate consumer segmenta-
tion in market 2, we plot the utility functions in the case (δ < θ < 1) as Figure 2 and that in the case (θ < δ < 1) as
Figure 3, respectively.
In the case (δ < θ < 1), the consumers are segmented into four groups in market 2: consumers with the highest will-
ingness to pay purchase product 1; consumers with the second highest willingness to pay purchase product 3 (i.e. parallel
imports); consumers with the third highest willingness to pay purchase product 2; consumers with the lowest willingness
to pay choose to purchase nothing. The consumer who is indifferent between product 1 and product 3 is located at
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p12p32
1h , the consumer who is indifferent between product 3 and product 2 is located at
p32p22
hd and the consumer who is
indifferent between product 3 and nothing to buy is located at p22d . Thus, the demands for product i (i = 1, 2, 3) in market









After calculations and simplifying, the corresponding inverse demand functions are given by
p11 ¼ a1  a1q11; (1)
p12 ¼ a2ð1 q12  dq22  hq32Þ; (2)
p22 ¼ a2dð1 q12  q22  q32Þ; (3)
p32 ¼ a2ðh hq12  dq22  hq32Þ: (4)
In the case (θ < δ < 1), by following the similar argument, we can derive the demand functions given by q11 ¼ 1 p11a1 ,








. Then, the inverse demand functions are given
by:
Figure 2. Consumer segmentation at equilibrium in the case (δ < θ < 1).
Figure 3. Consumer segmentation at equilibrium in the case (θ < δ < 1).
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p11 ¼ a1  a1q11; (5)
p12 ¼ a2ð1 q12  dq22  hq32Þ; (6)
p22 ¼ a2ðd dq12  dq22  hq32Þ; (7)
p32 ¼ a2hð1 q12  q22  q32Þ: (8)
In order to focus on the impact of gray markets, we ﬁrst set up a benchmark model in which parallel importation does
not occur, and we refer to it as the ‘no gray markets’ scenario. Next, we assume that authorised product 1, product 2
and parallel imports of product 1 coexist in the high market. There are two scenarios: the ﬁrst scenario is referred as
‘Buffer against follower’s product’, and the second scenario is referred as ‘Stimulating the competition’. In the ﬁrst sce-
nario, δ < θ < 1, the parallel imports enter the market 2 as a buffer between the competing manufacturers’ products (i.e.
product 1 and product 2). In the second scenario, the parallel imports only attack product 2 directly. However, product
1 is still impacted by the parallel imports entry because the attack from parallel imports may cause manufacturer 2 to
react by adjusting sale quantity of product 2 and this reaction would directly affects product 1. Under this scenario, par-
allel imports can ‘stimulate’ the competition between manufacturers by a chain of reactions. For each scenario men-
tioned above, we set up different reverse demand functions to examine the effect of gray markets in the context of
quantity competition.
3. Equilibrium outcomes
In this section, we characterise the equilibrium for the following three cases: ‘No gray markets’, ‘Buffer against fol-
lower’s product’ and ‘Stimulating the competition’.
3.1 Case 1: no gray markets
In the absence of gray markets, it is straightforward to derive the demand functions for the two markets, i.e.




a2ð1dÞd. The corresponding reverse demand functions are given by
p11 ¼ a1  a1q11, p12 ¼ a2ð1 q12  dq22Þ, p22 ¼ a2dð1 q12  q22Þ, respectively.
Given the sequence of stages of the game, we solve the model by backward induction. In stage 2, manufacturer 2
chooses the value of q22 to maximise his proﬁt (πM2).
max
q22
pM2 ¼ p22q22: (9)
Solving the ﬁrst-order condition from (9) yields q22 ¼ 12 q122 . Given the quantity chosen by manufacturer 2, manufac-
turer 1 decides on the optimal sale quantities to maximise the total proﬁt in the two markets (πM1).
max
q11;q12
pM1 ¼ p12q12 þ p11q11: (10)
Solving the ﬁrst-order condition from (10) yields the optimal quantities, i.e. q11 ¼ 12 and q12 ¼ 12.
Further, we obtain q22 ¼ 14, p11 ¼ a12 , p12 ¼ 12 d4
 
a2, p22 ¼ a2d4 , pM1 ¼ 14 d8
 
a2þ a14 and pM2 ¼ a2d16 . To ensure
p11 < p12, the condition
a2
a1
[ 22d must be satisﬁed, which indicates that to ensure the existence of price gap between
markets, the demand difference between markets should be big enough and the demand difference should be bigger
when the quality of product 2 becomes higher.
3.2 Case 2: buffer against follower’s product (δ < θ < 1)
In the presence of gray market, parallel imports ﬂood into market 2 due to arbitrage opportunity. For δ < θ < 1, parallel
imports may provide a buffer for manufacturer 1 against his competitor. In this scenario, parallel imports not only have
cannibalisation effect on product 1 but also seize market share from product 2.
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As shown in Section 2, the inverse demand functions for this case are given by p11 ¼ a1  a1q11,
p12 ¼ a2ð1 q12  dq22  hq32Þ, p22 ¼ a2dð1 q12  q22  q32Þ, p32 = a2(θ – θq12 – δq22 – θq32).
Solving by backward induction, parallel importer and manufacturer 2 simultaneously choose the quantities that max-
imise their own proﬁts (πP3 and πM2) as follows.
max
q32
pP3 ¼ ðp32  p11Þq32; (11)
max
q22
pM2 ¼ p22q22: (12)
Jointly solving the ﬁrst-order conditions for Equations (11) and (12), we obtain the equilibrium as follows.
q22 ¼ a1ð1 q11Þ þ a2hð1 q12Þa2 4h dð Þ ; (13)
q32 ¼ 2a1ðq11  1Þ þ ð2a2h a2dÞð1 q12Þa2 4h dð Þ : (14)
In contrast to Case 1, it is interesting to ﬁnd that the quantity of product 2 sold in market 2 decreases with respect
to the quantity of product 1 sold in market 1. This is because that the more product 1 sold in market 1, the lower the
price of product 1 in market 1 becomes. The low price of product 1 results in a low cost of parallel importation. Conse-
quently, the low cost of parallel importation leads to ﬁercer competition between product 2 and parallel imports, which
reduces the quantity of product 2 sold in market 2.
Anticipating quantity responses from manufacturer 2 and parallel importer, manufacturer 1 chooses optimal quanti-
ties to maximise the total proﬁt (πM1) in both market 1 and market 2.
max
q11;q12
pM1 ¼ p12q12 þ p11ðq11 þ q32Þ (15)
Solving the ﬁrst-order condition yields the optimal quantities:
q11 ¼ 2a1 þ a2h2a1  a2dþ 4a2h ; (16)
q12 ¼ 12 : (17)
Substituting q11 ¼ 2a1þa2h2a1a2dþ4a2h and q12 ¼ 12 into (13) and (14) yields
q22 ¼ 2a1 þ a2h4a1  2a2dþ 8a2h ; (18)
q32 ¼ 12
2a1 þ a2h
2a1  a2dþ 4a2h : (19)
From Equation (19), we obtain a2a1 [
2
2hd to satisfy q32 > 0. That means the demand difference should be big enough
to allow the existence of gray markets. The lower the perceived value of parallel imports is, or the higher the quality of
product 2 is, the higher the demand difference should be.
Further, we derive other equilibrium as follow:
p11 ¼ a1a2 3h dð Þ2a1  a2dþ 4a2h ; p12 ¼
a2
2
þ a1  2a1 þ a2hð Þ a1 þ a2hð Þ2a1  a2dþ 4a2h ;
p22 ¼ a2d 2a1 þ a2hð Þ4a1  2a2dþ 8a2h ; p32 ¼
a2 2a1 þ a2hð Þ 2h dð Þ
4a1  2a2dþ 8a2h :
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The proﬁts of manufacturers and parallel importer are given as follows: pM1 ¼ a24 þ a1  2a1þa2hð Þ
2
2 2a1a2dþ4a2hð Þ,
pM2 ¼ a2d 2a1þa2hð Þ
2
4 2a1a2dþ4a2hð Þ2 and pP3 ¼
a2h 2a2h2a1a2dð Þ2
4 2a1a2dþ4a2hð Þ2 .
3.3 Case 3: stimulating the competition (θ < δ < 1)
Here, we consider the case that the quality of parallel imports is lower than that of product 2. In this case, two versions
of product 1 compete with product 2 directly in the market 2. In other words, authorised product 1 competes with pro-
duct 2 for the consumers with the high willingness to pay and parallel imports compete with product 2 for the con-
sumers with the low willingness to pay. The intuition for this case is that manufacturer 1 might seize a larger share of
market 2 than that of Case 1 and Case 2, which is very beneﬁcial to manufacturer 1 in this case. However, could the
proﬁt of manufacturer 1 be really improved? To answer the question, we have to derive the equilibrium for this case.
We ﬁrst adopt the inverse demand functions derived for this scenario from Section 2: p11 ¼ a1  a1q11,
p12 ¼ a2ð1 q12  dq22  hq32Þ, p22 ¼ a2ðd dq12  dq22  hq32Þ, p32 = a2θ(1 – q12 – q22 – q32).
Using backward induction, manufacturer 2 and parallel importer simultaneously choose optimal quantities that
maximise their own proﬁts (πP3 and πM2), respectively, i.e.
maxq32pP3 ¼ ðp32  p11Þq32 (20)
max
q22
pM2 ¼ p22q22: (21)
Jointly solving the ﬁrst-order conditions for (20) and (21), we obtain the equilibrium given by
q22 ¼ a1ð1 q11Þ þ ð2a2d a2hÞð1 q12Þa2 4d hð Þ ; (22)
q32 ¼ d½a2hð1 q12Þ  2a1ð1 q11Þa2h 4d hð Þ : (23)
From the Equations (22) and (23), we develop some managerial insights as follows. It is interesting to note that the
quantity of product 1 sold in market 1 has a negative impact on the sale quantity of product 2 in market 2. This is
because of the pro-competitive effect of parallel imports. When the quantity of product 1 in market 1 increases, the
quantity of parallel imports also rises due to a low cost of parallel importation. As a result, more and more parallel
imports ﬂood into market 2 leading to ﬁercer competition against product 2, resulting in the sale decrease of product 2.
Besides, the quantity of product 1 sold in market 1 or market 2 also inﬂuences the quantity of parallel imports. When
the sale quantity of product 1 in market 1 increases or the sale quantity of product 1 in market 2 decreases, parallel
importation quantity becomes higher.
Anticipating quantity responses from manufacturer 2 and parallel importer, manufacturer 1 chooses optimal quanti-
ties to maximise the total proﬁt in both market 1 and market 2.
max
q11;q12
pM1 ¼ p12q12 þ p11ðq11 þ q32Þ (24)





q12 ¼ 12 : (26)
Substituting (25) and (26) into (22) and (23), we obtain q22 ¼ 12 a1dþh 2a2da1ð Þ8a2dhþ4a1d2a2h2 and q32 ¼
d a2h2a1ð Þ
8a2dhþ4a1d2a2h2.
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By ensuring q32 > 0, we have a2h[ 2a1 or a2a1 [
2
h. It implies that the quality of parallel imports should not be too
low and the difference between markets should not be too small such that parallel importer quits the gray markets. It is
intriguing to ﬁnd that whether the gray markets emerge only depends on the discounted value of parallel imports, which
also means the emergence of gray markets has no relationship with the quality of competing manufacturer’s products in
Case 3. However, when the parallel imports act as a buffer in Case 2, the emergence of gray markets not only depends
on the discounted value of parallel imports but also the quality of competing manufacturer’s products.
Furthermore, by substitution and simpliﬁcation, other equilibrium outcomes are given as follows.
p11 ¼ a1a2h 5d hð Þ
2 4a2dhþ 2a1d a2h2








a2d a1dþ a1h a2h2 þ 2a2dh
 
8a2dhþ 4a1d 2a2h2
; p32 ¼ a2h 3a1d a1hþ a2dhð Þ
8a2dhþ 4a1d 2a2h2
And the proﬁts of manufacturers and parallel importer are given as follows:






2 5d hð Þ2
8d a2h2 þ 4a2dhþ 2a1d
  ;
pM2 ¼
a2d a1dþ a1h a2h2 þ 2a2dh
 2
4 a2h2 þ 4a2dhþ 2a1d
 2 ; pP3 ¼ a2d2h 2a1  a2hð Þ
2
4 4a2dhþ 2a1d a2h2
 2 :
4. Comparison and managerial implications
We ﬁrst compare the equilibrium results among the three cases: ‘No gray markets’, ‘Buffer against follower’s product’
and ‘Stimulating the competition’. All the comparison results are summarised in Tables 1–3. Note that superscript i
stands for Case i(i = 1, 2, 3).
From Table 1, it is interesting to ﬁnd that manufacturer 1 always keeps sale quantity in high market unchanged as 12.




12, which implies that although the sale quantity is kept unchanged, the
price is mainly inﬂuenced by the competition from the parallel imports. The competition from parallel imports reduces
the price of product 1 in high market (p12). That is, when the quality of product 2 is given, the higher the perceived
value of parallel imports is, the lower the price of product 1 in high market (p12) is. The sales of product 2 in high mar-
ket are also severely impacted by the competition from parallel imports, both the sale quantity and the price of product
2 decrease in the presence of gray markets. When the quality of product 2 is given, the higher the perceived value of











22. We can conclude that in the presence of gray markets, both the price of product 1





11, which implies that manufacturer 1 raises the price in market 1 to prevent parallel importation according
to the competiveness of parallel imports.
In the differentiated duopoly, although the demand for parallel imports can improve the leading manufacturer’s proﬁt
in low market and the sales of parallel imports can take part of market share from the competing manufacturer in high
market, the presence of gray markets still hurts both the competing manufacturer’s proﬁt and the leading manufacturer’s
Table 1. Comparison of quantities.
























q32 n.a. n.a. q232[ q
3
32
Note: Henceforth, ‘n.a.’ is short for ‘not applicable’.
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proﬁt. The higher the perceived value of parallel imports is, the lower the manufacturers’ proﬁts are. It implies that the
competing effect from parallel imports can reduce both manufacturers’ proﬁts in the differentiated duopoly setting.
Next, we summarise some important management insight in the following propositions. The proofs of these proposi-
tions are given in the Appendix 1.
Proposition 1. In the case of ‘Buffer against follower’s product’, the proﬁts of both manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2 are
worse off compared with the case without gray markets, i.e. DpM1 ¼ pM1ðCase1Þ  pM1ðCase2Þ ¼ 2a2h2a1a2dð Þ
2
8 2a1a2dþ4a2hð Þ [ 0 and




[ 0: In the presence of gray markets, manufacturer 1
reduces the quantity of product 1 sold in low market (the price of product 1 would rise) while keeping the sale quantity in
high market unchanged, and manufacturer 2 reduces the sale quantity in high market.
Proposition 2. In the scenario of ‘Stimulating the competition’, the proﬁts of both manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2
are hurt by the presence of gray markets, i.e. DpM1 ¼ pM1ðCase1Þ  pM1ðCase3Þ ¼ d a2h2a1ð Þ
2
8 4a2dha2h2þ2a1dð Þ [ 0 and
DpM2 ¼ pM2ðCase1Þ  pM2ðCase3Þ ¼ 116 a2d 1 4 a2 2dhð Þhþa1 dþhð Þð Þ
2
2a1dþa2 4dhð Þhð Þ2
 
[ 0. In the presence of gray markets, manufac-
turer 1 reduces the sale quantity in low market and manufacturer 2 reduces the sale quantity in high market.
Combining Proposition 2 with Proposition 1, we conjecture that no matter whether the quality of parallel imports is
higher or lower than that of product 2, both manufacturers are always worse off in the presence of gray markets. We
can also infer that the consumer surplus in market 1 is reduced while the consumer surplus of buying product 1 in mar-
ket 2 increases when gray markets emerge.
To further investigate the manufacturers’ proﬁt loss caused by gray markets, we perform sensitivity analysis about
the impact of parameters on the proﬁt gap as shown in Table 4. Note that the proof of Table 4 is available in
Appendix 1. From Table 4, it is interesting to ﬁnd that the proﬁt gaps of both manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2 will
be reduced when the quality of manufacturer 2’s product increases. The explanation is as follows. When the quality of
manufacturer 2 is improved, parallel imports from gray markets become less attractive for consumers. Consequently, the
Table 4. Impact of parameters on proﬁt gap (↗: increasing, ↘: decreasing, ⊥: constant, n.a.: not applicable).
Case Proﬁt Gap a1 a2 δ θ
Case 1 vs. Case 2 ΔπM1 = πM1(Case1) – πM1(Case2) ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗
ΔπM2 = πM2(Case1) – πM2(Case2) ↘ n.a. n.a. ↗
Case 1 vs. Case 3 ΔπM1 = πM1(Case1) – πM1(Case3) ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗
ΔπM2 = πM2(Case1) – πM2(Case3) ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗
Table 2. Comparison of prices.


































p32 n.a. n.a. p232[ p
3
32
Table 3. Comparison of proﬁts.























πP3 n.a. n.a. p2P3[p
3
P3
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market share is mainly dominated by manufacturers 1 and 2, which increases the proﬁts for both manufacturers.
Although we cannot get analytical results at some places in Table 4, we can conjecture that in most cases when either
a1 or δ increases (either a2 or θ decreases), the parallel importation is restricted so that the proﬁt loss of manufacturers
becomes smaller.
Finally, we compare the equilibrium results between the scenarios ‘Buffer against follower’s product’ and ‘Stimulat-
ing the competition’ and we have the Propositions 3 and 4 as follows.
Proposition 3. Both manufacturers are worse off in the scenario ‘Buffer against follower’s product’ compared with the
scenario ‘Stimulating the competition’. Both manufacturers will prefer the situation ‘Stimulating the competition’ when
the gray markets emerge. In these two scenarios, both manufacturers’ proﬁts decrease when the perceived value of
parallel imports becomes higher.
Proposition 4. Comparing the scenarios under gray markets setting, parallel importer is better off in the scenario ‘Buffer
against follower’s product’. The proﬁt of parallel importer always increases as perceived value of parallel imports
becomes higher and decreases as the quality of product 2 increases.
According to Proposition 3, it is beneﬁcial for both manufacturers if manufacture 2 could improve the quality of its
products. To gain more managerial insights, we examine the impact of δ on the proﬁt change ratios of both manufactur-
ers 1 and 2. We consider two settings of parameters: a1 = 1, a2 = 5 and θ = 0.8 for Table 5(i) and a1 = 1, a2 = 5 and
θ = 0.6 Table 5(ii). For each setting, we test multiple values of δ and compute the corresponding proﬁt change ratios.
For instance, we test seven values (k = 7) of δ for Table 5(i) with δ1 = 0.6, …, δ7 = 0.9. pkM1 represents the proﬁt of
manufacturer 1 with δk.
From Tables 5(i) and 5(ii) we can ﬁnd that the values of proﬁt change ratios for both manufacturers decrease as δ
increases. As for manufacturer 2, the proﬁt change ratio is the largest when the value of δ is lowest. When δ is above
the quality of parallel imports θ, the proﬁt change ratio decreases signiﬁcantly. Based on this observation, manufacturer
2 should invest more on the quality improvement when the quality of product 2 is relatively low compared with the
quality of parallel imports. The reason is that such an improvement of quality can result in a sufﬁcient increase of mar-
ket share for manufacture 2, which yields a high proﬁt.
Comparing Table 5(i) with Table 5(ii), we can ﬁnd that when the quality of parallel imports θ becomes higher, the
impact of parameter δ on the proﬁt change ratios becomes weaker. Therefore, the presence of gray markets discourages
manufacturer 2’s motivation on the improvement of product quality. In particular, when the quality of parallel imports is
relatively high, manufacturer 2 has less incentive to invest in the quality improvement of its product due to the marginal
increase of the proﬁt. In short, from the view point of production research, our ﬁndings provide a valuable guideline for
manufacturer 2 to make a wise investment for product design.
Finally, we perform sensitivity analysis for all three cases in Table 6. Note that the proof of Table 6 is in
Appendix 1. We observe that without gray markets, the sale quantities are constants. With gray markets, the sale
quantity of product 1 in market 1 and sale quantity of product 2 in market 2 are affected by all these parameters listed
in Table 6.
Moreover, for Cases 2 and 3, we ﬁnd that an increase in the discounted value of parallel imports always leads to an
increase of price of product 1 in market 2 but a decrease of price (sale quantity) of product 2 in market 2. And the price
and sale quantity of parallel imports become higher when the discounted value of parallel imports increases. In the pres-
ence of gray markets, although manufacturer 2 only sells products in the high market, manufacturer 2 may still beneﬁt
from the increase of demand in the low market.
Furthermore, we observe that with the development of quality (the increase of δ) in the high market, manufacturer 2
increases the sale quantity of product 2 and the price of product 2 also increases. In response to the quality improve-
ment of competitor’s product, manufacturer 1 increases the sale quantity in the low market and keeps the sale quantity
Table 5(i). The impact of parameter δ on the proﬁt change ratios (a1 = 1, a2 = 5, θ = 0.8).
δk 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
pkM1 1.05 1.03 1.01 0.99 0.96 0.93 0.90
pk
M2
0.12 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.22
pkþ1M1 pkM1
pkM1
 100 −1.94 −2.04 −2.16 −2.29 −3.18 −3.29
pkþ1M2 pkM2
pkM2
 100 12.04 11.44 10.94 10.51 8.90 8.13
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in the high market unchanged and the prices of product 1 in both markets decrease. In addition, parallel importer
reduces the sale quantity of parallel imports. This can be explained as follows. Because parallel imports are affected
directly by the quality improvement of product 2, the sale quantity of parallel imports is reduced by the ﬁercer competi-
tion from product 2. Regarding parallel imports as one version of product 1, to maintain the market share, manufacturer
1 has to encourage more parallel imports sold in the high market to compete against manufacturer 2’s product. Namely,
the manufacturer increases the sale quantity in the low market and the price is correspondingly reduced, which leads to
a lower cost for parallel importation. It is interesting to ﬁnd that the sale quantity of product 1 in the high market is
constant for all cases and is not affected by any parameters. In another word, the leading manufacturer copes with the
challenges from the following manufacturer and parallel importer only by adjusting the sale quantity in the low market
but never changes the sale quantity in the high market.
5. Conclusion
The paper studies the impact of gray markets on manufacturers’ optimal strategies and proﬁts in differentiated duopoly
by introducing manufacturer competition in the high market. Using ‘no gray markets’ as benchmark scenario, we
address the gray marketing issues in differentiated duopoly setting characterised by two scenarios (i.e. the case of ‘buffer
Table 5(ii). The impact of parameter δ on the proﬁt change ratios (a1 = 1, a2 = 5, θ = 0.6).
δk 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8
pkM1 1.16 1.14 1.11 1.08 1.05 1.02 0.99
pk
M2
0.12 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.22
pkþ1M1 pkM1
pkM1
 100 −2.08 −2.22 −2.79 −2.87 −2.96 −3.05
pkþ1M2 pkM2
pkM2
 100 14.94 14.11 10.42 9.39 8.55 7.85
Table 6. Impact of parameters on optimal solution (↗: increasing, ↘: decreasing, ⊥: constant, n.a.: not applicable).
Case a1 a2 δ θ
Case 1 q11 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ n.a.
q12 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ n.a.
q22 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ n.a.
p11 ↗ ⊥ ⊥ n.a.
p12 ⊥ ↗ ↘ n.a.
p22 ⊥ ↗ ↗ n.a.
πM1 ↗ ↗ ↘ n.a.
πM2 ⊥ ↗ ↗ n.a.
Case 2 q11 ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘
q12 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
q22 ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘
q32 ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗
p11 ↗ ↗ ↘ ↗
p12 ↗ ↗ ↘ ↗
p22 ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘
p32 ↗ ↗ ↘ ↗
πM1 ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘
πM2 ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘
πP3 ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗
Case 3 q11 ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘
q12 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
q22 ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘
q32 ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗
p11 ↗ ↗ ↘ ↗
p12 ↗ ↗ ↘ ↗
p22 ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘
p32 ↗ ↗ ↘ ↗
πM1 ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘
πM2 ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘
πP3 ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗
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against follower’s product’ and the case of ‘stimulating the competition’). By analysing these two scenarios, we obtain
equilibrium results for manufacturers and parallel importer in differentiated duopoly.
The key contribution of this study is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the impact of gray markets in dif-
ferentiate duopoly. In comparison of gray markets in the monopoly case, gray markets would play a completely different
role in this differentiated duopoly case and the situation is much more complicated. On the one hand, parallel imports
can help the leading manufacturer to enlarge the market share by competing with the follower’s products. On the
another hand, the parallel importer enters the market by selling unauthorised products as the competitor of the leading
manufacturer, which cannibalises the sale of authorised products of the leading manufacturer. Hence, the impact of gray
markets on the leading manufacturer’s proﬁt is a trade-off between the cannibalisation effect and the demand
enlargement effect caused by the gray markets. Our study explicitly characterises such a trade-off. Further, in face of
competition from the leading manufacturer and parallel importers, our study gives a guideline to the following manufac-
turer about how it should strategically design its own product with an appropriate quality in order to maintain com-
petiveness.
Next, we highlight our ﬁndings that are different from the related literature. For the monopoly case, both Ahmadi
and Yang (2000) and Xiao, Palekar, and Liu (2011) show that the manufacturer can beneﬁt from gray markets under
certain channel structures. Different from their ﬁndings, our results show that no matter whether the quality of parallel
imports is higher or lower than follower’s products, the leading manufacturer’s proﬁt is always worse off by the pres-
ence of gray markets. Although both manufacturers’ proﬁts are hurt by the presence of gray markets, the case ‘stimulat-
ing the competition’ is relatively better for them between these two kinds of gray market settings. Parallel imports with
a high perceived value will decrease both manufacturers’ proﬁts compared with parallel imports with a low perceived
value. And the proﬁt of parallel importer always increases as the perceived value of parallel imports becomes high and
decreases as the quality of product 2 increases.
For the duopoly case, Shavandi, Valizadeh Khaki, and Khedmati (2015) show that the proﬁt of the manufacturer
challenged by gray markets may be better off in the low market with a symmetric demand. Different from their ﬁndings,
our results indicate that manufacturers suffer from a proﬁt loss under competition in the high market with asymmetric
demand. Moreover, our paper shows that the leading manufacturer can deal with the ﬁerce competition from the follow-
ing manufacturer and parallel importer only by adjusting sale quantity decision in low market. To increase the proﬁt, the
following manufacturer should make great efforts on the improving the quality of its products when the quality of
parallel imports is relatively low compared with the authorised products.
As a direction of future research, one limitation of the current model is that we ignore the exogenous transaction
costs. Since the exogenous transaction costs may be beneﬁcial to manufacturers in the presence of gray markets, it may
be worthy to take the transaction costs into account in the analysis of gray markets. The other limitation is our assump-
tion of the deterministic demand. It is interesting to investigate the impact of gray market under a stochastic demand
environment.
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Appendix 1
Proof of proposition 1
Compared with benchmark scenario (i.e. no gray markets), we have q11\ 12, q22\
1
4, q12 ¼ 12, p11[ a12 , p12\ 12 d4
 
a2, p22[ a2d4 .
And we obtain that DpM1 ¼  2a2h2a1a2dð Þ
2




\0 when the constraints of h[ d and
(2θ – δ)a2 > 2a1 are binding.
Here, p12  12 d4
 
a2 ¼ ða2d2a2hÞð2a2ha2d2a1Þ2a1a2dþ4a2h \0 and other expressions can be obtained easily and hence the detailed derivation is
omitted.
Proof of proposition 2









The expressions DpM1 ¼  d a2h2a1ð Þ
2
8 4a2dha2h2þ2a1dð Þ\0 and DpM2 ¼
1
16 a2d 1þ 4 a2 2dhð Þhþa1 dþhð Þð Þ
2
2a1dþa2 4dhð Þhð Þ2
 
\0 holds under the condition






4ð1d2Þ. Then, Proposition 2 is directly followed from the above results.
Proof of proposition 3
We have pM1 ¼ a24 þ a1  2a1þa2hð Þ
2
2 2a1a2dþ4a2hð Þ (δ < θ < 1),






2 5d hð Þ2
8d a2h2 þ 4a2dhþ 2a1d
  ðh\d\1Þ;
pM2 ¼ a2d 2a1 þ a2hð Þ
2
4 2a1  a2dþ 4a2hð Þ2
ðd\h\1Þ;
pM2 ¼
a2d a1dþ a1h a2h2 þ 2a2dh
 2
4 a2h2 þ 4a2dhþ 2a1d
 2 ðh\d\1Þ:
Under the scenario ‘Buffer against follower’s product’ (δ < θ < 1), it requires a2a1 [
2
2hd to satisfy q32 > 0. Under the scenario ‘Stimu-
lating the competition’ (θ < δ < 1), it requires a2a1 [
2
h to satisfy q32 > 0.





2a1þa2d2a2hð Þ 2a1þa2hð Þ
2a1a2dþ4a2hð Þ2 \0 and
@pM2
@h ¼ 
a22d 6a1þa2dð Þ 2a1þa2hð Þ
2 2a1a2dþ4a2hð Þ3 \0. Under the scenario ‘Stimulating
the competition’ (θ < δ < 1), we have @pM1@h ¼ a2d 2a1a2hð Þ 3a1da1hþa2dhð Þ2 2a1dþ4a2dha2h2ð Þ2 \0 and
@pM2
@h ¼
a2d a1dþa1hþ2a2dha2h2ð Þ 2a21d2a1a2dhþa1a2h22a22dh2ð Þ
2 2a1dþ4a2dha2h2ð Þ3 \0.
When θ = δ, we can get πM1(δ < θ < 1) = πM1(θ < δ < 1) and πM2(δ < θ < 1) = πM2(θ < δ < 1). Then, we conclude that given the
value of δ, the proﬁts of manufacturers decrease as the value of θ increases. This implies that the parallel imports with a high per-
ceived value will decrease both manufacturers’ proﬁts compared with parallel imports with a low perceived value. Furthermore, we
can infer that both manufacturers are worse off in the scenario ‘Buffer against follower’s product’ compared with the scenario ‘Stimu-
lating the competition’.
Proof of proposition 4
Under the scenario ‘Buffer against follower’s product’ (δ < θ < 1), we have:
@pP3
@h
¼ a2 2a2h 2a1  a2dð Þ a
2
2d
2 þ 8a22h2 þ 20a1a2h 2a22dh 4a21
 






2h 2a1 þ a2d 2a2hð Þ 2a1 þ a2hð Þ
2a1  a2dþ 4a2hð Þ3
\0:
Under the scenario ‘Stimulating the competition’ (θ < δ < 1), we have: @pP3@h ¼
a2d
2 a2h2a1ð Þ 14a1a2dhþ4a22dh2þa22h34a21d6a1a2h2ð Þ






Proof of Table 4:
By comparing Case 1 and Case 2: we obtain that DpM1 ¼ 2a2h2a1a2dð Þ
2




[ 0 with the
constraints of h[ d and (2θ – δ)a2 > 2a1. And we have:






¼ 2a1 þ a2 d 2hð Þð Þ 2a1 3d 8hð Þ þ a2 d 4hð Þ 2h dð Þð Þ




¼  a2 2a1 þ a2 d 2hð Þð Þ 2a1 þ a2hð Þ




¼ a2 2a1 þ a2 d 2hð Þð Þ 6a1  a2dþ 6a2hð Þ






2d d 3hð Þ 2a1 þ a2hð Þ






2d 6a1 þ a2dð Þ 2a1 þ a2hð Þ
2 2a1  a2dþ 4a2hð Þ3
[ 0
By comparing Case 1 and Case 3: we obtain that DpM1 ¼ d a2h2a1ð Þ
2
8 4a2dha2h2þ2a1dð Þ [ 0 and DpM2 ¼
1
16 a2d 1 4 a2 2dhð Þhþa1 dþhð Þð Þ
2
2a1dþa2 4dhð Þhð Þ2
 
[ 0 with
the constraint a2h[ 2a1. And we have:
@DpM1
@a1
¼ d 2a1  a2hð Þ 2a1dþ a2 9d 2hð Þhð Þ




¼ dh 2a1  a2hð Þ 2a1 6dþ hð Þ þ a2h 4dþ hð Þð Þ




¼  a2d 2a1  a2hð Þ 3a1d a1hþ a2dhð Þ
2 2a1dþ 4a2dh a2h2
 2 [ 0 @DpM1@d ¼  a2h
2 2a1  a2hð Þ2






2d 5d hð Þh2 a2 2d hð Þhþ a1 dþ hð Þð Þ





2 2a1  a2hð Þ 4a21dþ a22 4d 3hð Þh2 þ 2a1a2h 5dþ hð Þ
 




¼  a2d a1dþ a1hþ 2a2dh a2h
2  2a21d 2a1a2dhþ a1a2h2  2a22dh2 
2 2a1dþ 4a2dh a2h2
 3 [ 0
Proof of Table 6:





















































(2) As for Case 2, (2θ – δ)a2 > 2a1, we have:
@q11
@a1
¼  2a2 d 3hð Þ




¼ 2a1 d 3hð Þ




¼ a2 2a1 þ a2hð Þ




¼  a2 6a1 þ a2dð Þ




¼  a2 d 3hð Þ




¼ a1 d 3hð Þ




¼ 2a2 2a1 þ a2hð Þ




¼  a2 6a1 þ a2dð Þ
2 2a1  a2dþ 4a2hð Þ2
\0
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@q32
@a1
¼ 2a2 d 3hð Þ




¼  2a1 d 3hð Þ




¼  a2 2a1 þ a2hð Þ




¼ a2 6a1 þ a2dð Þ






2 d 4hð Þ d 3hð Þ






1 d 3hð Þ




¼  a1a2 2a1 þ a2hð Þ




¼ a1a2 6a1 þ a2dð Þ













1 1 dþ hð Þ  4a1a2 dþ 2 2þ hð Þhð Þ þ a22 d 4hð Þ dþ 2 2þ hð Þhð Þ




¼  a2 a1 þ a2hð Þ 2a1 þ a2hð Þ
2a1  a2dþ 4a2hð Þ2
\0;




1 þ a1a2 3d 4hð Þ þ 2a22 d 2hð Þh
 






2d d 3hð Þ






1 þ 4a1a2hþ a22h dþ 4hð Þ
 




¼ a2 2a1 þ a2hð Þ a1 þ 2a2hð Þ






2d 6a1 þ a2dð Þ






2 d 3hð Þ d 2hð Þ




¼ d 2hð Þ 4a
2
1  4a1a2hþ a22 d 4hð Þh
 




¼  a2 a1 þ a2hð Þ 2a1 þ a2hð Þ






a2 1þ 2a1 þ a2dð Þ 6a1 þ a2dð Þ







2 d 3hð Þ2






1 4 8dþ 16hð Þ  4a1a2 dþ 2 2þ hð Þhð Þ þ a22 d 4hð Þ dþ 2 2þ hð Þhð Þ




¼  a2 2a1 þ a2hð Þ
2
2 2a1  a2dþ 4a2hð Þ2
\0;
ð2h dÞa2[ 2a1 ) @pM1
@h
¼ a2 2a1 þ a2 d 2hð Þð Þ 2a1 þ a2hð Þ




¼ a2d 2a1 þ a2hð Þ
2
4 2a1  a2dþ 4a2hð Þ2
[ 0
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@pM2
@a2
¼ d 2a1 þ a2hð Þ 4a
2
1 þ 2a1a2 d hð Þ þ a22h dþ 4hð Þ
 




¼ a2 2a1 þ a2hð Þ
2 2a1 þ a2 dþ 4hð Þð Þ






2d 6a1 þ a2dð Þ 2a1 þ a2hð Þ






2 2a1 þ a2 d 2hð Þð Þ d 3hð Þh




¼ h 2a1  a2dþ 2a2hð Þ 4a
2
1 þ a22 d 4hð Þ d 2hð Þ þ 4a1a2 2dþ 5hð Þ
 






2 2a1 þ a2 d 2hð Þð Þh 2a1 þ a2hð Þ




¼  a2 2a1 þ a2 d 2hð Þð Þ 4a
2
1 þ 20a1a2hþ a22 d2  2dhþ 8h2
  
4 2a1  a2dþ 4a2hð Þ3
[ 0
(3) As for Case 3, a2h[ 2a1, we have:
@q11
@a1
¼ a2d 5d hð Þh




¼ a1dh 5dþ hð Þ





2 2a1 þ a2hð Þ




¼  a2d 10a1d 4a1hþ a2h
2
 




¼ a2 5d hð Þh
2





2 5dþ hð Þ




¼ h 2a1 þ a2hð Þ a1 þ 2a2hð Þ




¼ 2a1dða1  a2hÞ þ a2h
2 a1  2a2dð Þ




¼ a2dh 5dþ hð Þ




¼ a1d 5d hð Þh





2 2a1 þ a2hð Þ




¼ a2d 10a1d 4a1hþ a2h
2 







2 20d2  9dhþ h2 






1d 5d hð Þh





2 2a1  a2hð Þ




¼ a1a2d 10a1d 4a1hþ a2h
2
 
2 2a1dþ a2 4d hð Þhð Þ2
[ 0





2d 5d hð Þh2







2  2a21d3 þ 2a21d2hþ 16a1a2d2h 8a1a2d3h 4a1a2dh2 þ 16a22d2h2  8a22d3h2  8a22dh3 þ 2a22d2h3 þ a22h4
 
2 2a1dþ 4a2dh a2h2
 2 [ 0; @p12@d
¼  a2 2a
2
1d
2 þ 4a22d 2d hð Þh2 þ a1a2h 8d2  2dhþ h2
  






1d 2a1a2dhþ a2 a1  2a2dð Þh2
 






2d 5d hð Þh2
2 2a1dþ 4a2dh a2h2
 2 [ 0;
@p22
@a2
¼ d 4a1a2d 2d hð Þhþ 2a
2
1d dþ hð Þ þ a22h2 8d2  6dhþ h2
  







2 þ a22h2 8d2  4dhþ h2
  a1ah 8d2 þ 2dhþ h2  






1d 2a1a2dhþ a2 a1  2a2dð Þh2
 







2 10d2  7dhþ h2 






1 6d 2hð Þ þ 4a1a2dhþ a22 4d hð Þh2
 





2 2a1  a2hð Þ a1 þ a2hð Þ






1d 4a1 a1  a2dð Þhþ a2 a1 þ 4a2dð Þh2
 






2 5d hð Þ2h2
4 2a1dþ 4a2dh a2h2
 2 [ 0;
@pM1
@a2
¼  4a1a2dh 2 2þ dð Þdþ hð Þ þ a
2
2 4d hð Þh2 2 2þ dð Þdþ hð Þ þ 2a21d 2þ dð Þd 6dhh2
  




¼  a2 a1 d hð Þ þ 2a2dhð Þ a2 2d hð Þhþ a1 dþ hð Þð Þ




¼  a2d 2a1 þ a2hð Þ 3a1d a1hþ a2dhð Þ
2 2a1dþ a2 4d hð Þhð Þ2
\0





2d 5d hð Þh2 a2 2d hð Þhþ a1 dþ hð Þð Þ




¼ d a2 2d hð Þhþ a1 dþ hð Þð Þ 2a
2
1d dþ hð Þ þ a1ah 8d2  9dhþ h2
 þ a22h2 8d2  6dhþ h2   




¼ a2 a2 2d hð Þhþ a1 dþ hð Þð Þ 2a
2
1d d hð Þ þ a22h2 8d2  2dhþ h2
  a1a2h 8d2 þ 5dhþ h2   




¼  a2d 2a
2
1dþ 2a1a2dhþ a2 a1 þ 2a2dð Þh2
 
a2 2d hð Þhþ a1 dþ hð Þð Þ







2h2 5dþ hð Þ 2a1 þ a2hð Þ





2h 2a1  a2hð Þ 4a21dþ 2a1a2h 7dþ hð Þ þ a22h2 4dþ hð Þ
 







3 2a1 þ a2hð Þ2





2 2a1 þ a2hð Þ 4a21dþ 2a1a2 7d 3hð Þhþ a22h2 4dþ hð Þ
 
4 2a1dþ a2 4d hð Þhð Þ3
[ 0
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